Early modern Sanskrit thought and the quest for a perfect understanding of property by Kroll, E.
I I A S  N e w s l e t t e r  |  # 4 3  |  S p r i n g  2 0 0 71 2
> Comparative Intellectual Histories of Early Modern Asia
Early modern Sanskrit thought
and the quest for a perfect 
understanding of property
In Sanskrit discourse, discussions about property and ownership traditionally belonged to two disciplines: 
hermeneutics (mimamsa) and moral-legal science (dharma-sastra). Scholars of hermeneutics tended 
to ponder the question of what motivated people to acquire and alienate property, and scholars of 
moral-legal science contemplated exactly how people did acquire, use and alienate property. Beginning 
in the 16th century, however, a remarkable disciplinary shift occurred. 
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A group of scholars of what was termed ‘new logic’ (navya-nyaya) 
established a movement devoted to 
the analysis of property, ownership, 
inheritance and a wide range of other 
aspects of civil law. They reasoned that 
both hermeneutics and moral-legal sci-
ence had been addressing legal matters 
by using terms and concepts that were 
essentially undefined. It was very nice 
to explain how or why people became 
owners of property, but what did ‘being 
an owner’ actually mean? If we were to 
see two men, each holding a ball, and 
knew that only one man owned his ball, 
what, precisely, would allow us to dis-
cern one man as the owner of his ball 
and the other man as not owning his 
ball? The new logicians determined that 
they could use the discursive method 
peculiar to their philosophical system to 
resolve such questions. Their efforts cre-
ated what I call the Sanskrit philosophy 
of law, a new branch of Sanskrit thought 
devoted exclusively to the understand-
ing of those concepts intrinsic to legal 
doctrine.1
‘Property’: a universal 
concept
The emergence of this Sanskrit phi-
losophy of law depended first on a late-
11th century ascetic named Vijnanes-
vara. In a groundbreaking work of 
moral-legal science entitled Mitaksara 
(The Breviloquent), Vijnanesvara con-
cluded that property was a universal 
concept. He noted that ‘people who live 
beyond [our] borders, who are unaware 
of the practices [discussed] by works of 
moral-legal science, nevertheless make 
use of the concept of property, because 
we see that they buy and sell [things]’. 
Specific laws could, and, in fact, did, 
differ from place to place, but the basic 
conceptions behind these differing 
laws remained constant. The notions 
of property and ownership could not, 
therefore, be traced to some specific, 
authoritative text or oral work, but had 
to exist in the world of shared human 
experience.
For Vijnanesvara, property and own-
ership achieved their full expression 
within the total ambit of a property law 
that was temporally and regionally cir-
cumscribed. As a result, established 
legal practices and dictates would pro-
vide sufficient answers to questions 
such as how we knew property to be 
property and an owner to be an owner. 
In the eyes of a group of philosophers 
specialising in the emerging discipline 
of new logic, however, the characterisa-
tion of universal concepts through legal 
particulars proved unsatisfactory.
New logic and the 
development of 
a philosophy of law
The landmark Tattva-cinta-mani (The 
Philosopher’s Stone for the Real Nature 
of the Material World) of Gangesa 
Upadhyaya (fl. late 13th c.) had encour-
aged scholars of new logic to develop a 
vocabulary of Sanskrit terms infused 
with highly technical meanings with 
which they could construct precise and 
accurate characterisations of what peo-
ple actually knew and how they knew 
it.2 These new logicians distanced 
themselves from the ‘old’ logic, which 
had focused on a broad range of issues 
unrelated to epistemological concerns, 
and they tended to privilege views that 
belonged to proponents of ‘new’ (navya), 
or ‘very new’ (atinavina), ideas. While 
the new logicians developed original 
approaches to old problems, they were 
equally determined to explore new 
philosophical territory. In particular, 
they were captivated by the question of 
how human beings actually recognised 
owners and property as such. Gangesa’s 
own son, the 14th century philosopher 
Vardhamana Upadhyaya, may have 
been the first writer on new logic to 
think about such issues, and he was 
soon accompanied by such luminaries 
as Sankara Misra (15th c.) and Raghu-
natha Siromani (16th c.). 
Raghunatha must be credited with 
establishing property and ownership 
as canonical concerns for new logic. 
In a work he called the Pada-artha-tat-
tva-nirupana (An Investigation into the 
True Nature of Conceptual Categories), 
Raghunatha noted that previous schol-
ars had made the grievous error of try-
ing to understand property and owner-
ship in terms of an object’s capacity for 
legitimate employment. Such reason-
ing allowed us to discern a man who 
ate someone else’s food as the owner 
of that food, which meant there was no 
reason for us not to attribute ownership 
to thieves who made appropriate use of 
their stolen goods.
Raghunatha wanted to impress upon his 
audience that an object’s status as prop-
erty could not depend upon its potential 
for use, much as a person’s status as an 
owner could not depend on his capac-
ity to use. Instead, our knowledge of an 
owner and his property had to be inde-
pendent of any activity on the part of 
either the person owning or the object 
owned. Raghunatha argued that the 
easiest solution was to root our entire 
knowledge of property and ownership 
in the objective authority of the corpus 
of works on moral-legal science. In this 
way, we would recognise as ‘property’ 
and ‘owner’ what moral-legal science 
called property and whom it called an 
owner. Yet Raghunatha also recognised 
that property and ownership existed out-
side the confines of moral-legal science. 
To this end, he suggested that property 
and ownership were characterised 
the world over by the cause and effect 
relationship. Certain events, such as 
purchase, resulted in the production of 
ownership, just as certain other events, 
such as sale, resulted in the destruction 
of that ownership. Property and owner-
ship could then be viewed as the results 
of this causal framework, and knowl-
edge of the causes themselves would be 
derived from the local laws in force. 
Raghunatha cleverly avoided defining 
property and ownership per se. But his 
successor, the 16th c. scholar Rama-
bhadra Sarvabhauma, was willing to 
argue that linguistic expressions such 
as ‘John’s horse’ caused us to recognise 
the presence of a relationship through 
which John and the horse assumed the 
new and mutually dependent identi-
ties of ‘owner’ and ‘property’. What 
remained in question was how, precise-
ly, this relationship functioned.
The maturation of the 
philosophy of law
The 17th and early 18th centuries wit-
nessed an explosion of activity, as the 
work of both Raghunatha and Rama-
bhadra provoked new logicians and, 
to a lesser extent, hermeneutists and 
scholars of moral-legal science to 
construct definitions of property and 
ownership. Those involved in this 
endeavour included the era’s brightest 
minds in Sanskrit thought, such as the 
new logicians Gadadhara Bhattacarya, 
Jayarama Nyayapancanana and Goku-
lanatha Upadhyaya; the specialists in 
moral-legal science Nilakantha Bhatta 
and Mitra Misra; the hermeneutist 
Kamalakara Bhatta; and the Jain logi-
cian Yasovijaya. These philosophers 
were pre-eminent in their fields, and 
it is telling that they all deemed work 
on a theory of property and ownership 
to be professionally and intellectually 
worthwhile. 
Increasing interest in property and 
ownership did not, however, lead to a 
conclusive definition of the two con-
cepts. Instead, 17th and 18th century 
scholars of new logic, moral-legal sci-
ence and hermeneutics demonstrated 
their ingenuity by constructing unique 
approaches to the matter. Their pursuit 
of originality led them to reject or mod-
ify the views of both prior and contem-
porary thinkers in order to distinguish 
themselves as singularly capable of solv-
ing what appeared to be an intractable 
problem. In addition, the Sanskrit phi-
losophy of law had become an increas-
ingly interdisciplinary enterprise, and 
doctrinal differences often rendered 
competing characterisations of property 
and ownership incompatible. 
Of perhaps greater interest is that schol-
arship of the 17th and 18th centuries 
expanded the examination of property 
and ownership to include a wide range 
of legal phenomena. Jayarama, writ-
ing in his Karakavyakhya (An Expla-
nation of Grammatical Case-Relation-
ships), asked whether ‘sale’ and ‘barter’ 
were really conceptually identical, and 
Gokulanatha, writing in his Nyayasid-
dhantatattvaviveka (A Meditation on the 
Truth about the Established Conclu-
sions of the System of Logic), explored 
how gambling contests resulted in the 
destruction of the loser’s ownership and 
the creation of the winner’s. 
The 17th century also witnessed the 
emergence of a genre of juridico-philo-
sophical treatises that used the method-
ology of new logic to address legal con-
cerns. The most significant of these was 
the curiously anonymous Svatvarahasya 
(The Mystery of the Proprietary Relation-
ship). Gifts, inheritance and religious 
offerings had been the subject of innu-
merable disagreements among schol-
ars of moral-legal science, and either a 
new logician or a group of new logicians 
determined to resolve them. He, or they, 
thus composed the Svatvarahasya, a 
series of essays devoted to demonstrating 
the logically sound – and, in the view of 
the new logicians, correct – understand-
ing of contentious legal topics. 
It appears that the composition of such 
treatises continued into and beyond the 
18th century, and there are numerous 
essay-style works from the 18th and 
19th centuries on individual legal topics 
that remain in manuscript form. Judg-
ing from the Svatvarahasya, it would 
seem that the Sanskrit philosophy of 
law was well beyond its infancy, and it 
is reasonable to conjecture that subse-
quent work would have continued the 
Svatvarahasya’s methodological trend.
The Sanskrit philosophy of law was 
a remarkable development that mir-
rored a period of renewed creativity in 
Sanskrit thought. Its evolution, from 
a subject of limited interest to a small 
number of new logicians into an intel-
lectual movement that elicited the 
contributions of leading scholars from 
multiple disciplines, has been a focus of 
my dissertation. To this end, I have been 
engaged in preparing translations and 
analyses of those texts that constitute 
the Sanskrit philosophy of law. It is my 
hope that their eventual publication will 
lead to further inquiry into a neglected 
area of intellectual history. <
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